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Reconsidering Debt Remission in 




Abstract: This article situates the recent calls for debt remission, or Jubilee, 
in terms of the history of debt. It goes back to ancient Southwest Asia (and 
Rome), where we find three functions of debt. It was primarily a means for 
securing labour of the context of a chronic shortage of labour. Its secondary 
features included the flow of wealth to the lender and the securing of class 
differences. However, we need to distinguish debt from credit, since the two 
are often assumed to be part of the same structure. While debt was extractive, 
credit was allocative. It relied on a mutual system of knowing interaction among 
village communities. With these distinctions in mind, it is possible to return 
to the question of remission or amelioration. On this matter, I argue that such 
amelioration was only partial and targeted, functioning as a safety valve for 
an economic system facing crisis. It was also the opportunity for significant 
political spin, and did little to alleviate the actual problems. The article closes by 
considering the implications for today.
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In the aftermath of the Great Recession, which first hit Atlantic countries in 2007, 
we have witnessed renewed calls for a remission of debts, or Jubilee (borrowing 
a biblical term).1 In its biblical tenor, the Jubilee is the year after seven times 
seven years, when debts would be cancelled: “And you shall hallow the fiftieth 
year and you shall proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its inhabitants. It 
shall be a jubilee for you: you shall return, every one of you, to your property 
and every one of you to your family” (Leviticus 25:8). In other words, no debt 
was to be permanent, for it would be annulled over 50 year cycles. The current 
reformulation of the Jubilee draws less on the specific ritual practice and more 
on the principal itself. Onerous and oppressive debts should be cancelled, 
whether in terms of the global north-south dichotomy, or within the Eurozone, 
or in terms of lower-working class people burdened with unrepayable debts.2 Of 
course, the only ones thus far bailed out by governments have been the banks 
themselves, with bad debts bought out and banks propped up.
 But is such a Jubilee really worthwhile? What lies behind it and can 
it actually work? In order to examine the theory and practice of Jubilee, we 
need to look back a few millennia, to ancient Southwest Asia from the fourth 
millennium BCE onwards, as also some practices from ancient Rome. To do so, 
I consider the nature of debt in contrast to credit, situate these practices within 
particular contexts, and then return to the question of the Jubilee itself.  
 
Debt
The primary theoretical distinction crucial to understanding debt and credit 
is that between extraction and allocation. Simply put, allocation entails the 
allocation and reallocation of labour, fields, animals, tools, produce, and the very 
structure of human life. By contrast, extraction entails the appropriation of the 
labour, produce, and so on, from someone who engages in labour by someone 
who does not so engage. Extraction may take two forms: exploitation, in which 
the non-labourer extracts labour and produce from an entity under his or her 
control; expropriation, which entails extraction from what one does not control 
directly (thus, tax is internal plunder, while booty is external plunder, taken from 
another possessor). These relatively straightforward theoretical distinctions 
are my own response to a complex debate, for which the name of Karl Polanyi 
stands as the symbol.
 Polanyi tackled what was by then a long debate of well over a century, 
which sought for a way to understand economies of the ancient world. 
Called the ‘oikos’ debate, it was divided into those who took ‘primitivist’ and 
‘modernist’ positions, to wit, that the ancient economies were bound up with 
the household (oikos) and thereby qualitatively different from capitalism, or 
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that they were largely the same.3 Polanyi completely recast the debate through 
two related distinctions.4 The first was between formalism and substantivism. 
Thus, the ancients in those parts of the world either made use of the same 
economic forms as capitalism (due to the eternity of human nature), or they 
were substantively different from us, so much so that it becomes difficult 
indeed to understand how they really functioned. The second distinction was 
between reciprocity, redistribution and the market. Polanyi drew heavily upon 
the work of Malinowski and framed it in Weberian terms: reciprocity was the 
complex patterns of gift exchange and mutual obligation; redistribution was 
the gathering of all produce by a central authority and its redistribution to 
the people; and the market really arose only with capitalism, although even 
then it was always ‘embedded’ in social relations. The insights were many, but 
the problems even more. In the ancient economies in which I am interested, 
central authorities – despots and aspiring emperors – were little interested in 
redistribution. Their main concern was acquisition, through plunder, tribute and 
tax. Polanyi’s point concerning the market is well taken, although his interpreters 
have often seen the ‘market’ as an entity unto itself (for which Adam Smith 
remains the slogan). The reality is far different, especially when seen from a 
Marxist perspective, in which social relations (class) are inextricably tied up 
with the patterns of exploitation mentioned above. So my distinction between 
allocation and extraction – in which the first is a recasting of reciprocity and 
communal agricultural life and the second accounts more directly for patterns 
of exploitation – is an effort to account for the realities of ancient economies in 
light of Marxist approaches.
 Let us see how this works with debt. In contrast to the allocative role of 
credit, debt functions as an extractive economic device, in which those who do 
not labour seek to extract surplus from those who do engage in labour. Thus, 
debt extracts labour, goods and money from a debtor with the outcome that 
the lender’s wealth increases and power is consolidated. Debt does so in three 
main ways, with the priority varying over time and place. In ancient Southwest 
Asia, the primary function of debt was compulsion for labour, especially in a 
situation where labour was in relatively limited supply. I cannot delve into the 
full argument here for the shortage of labor, but the following should be noted: 
infant mortality at a rate of 50-60 percent; life expectancy of approximately 
30; disease cycles (note the absence of toilets in the archaeological record); 
constant mechanisms for securing labor, such as the primary function of debt 
in order to indenture labor, or standard punishments stipulating periods of 
indentured labor on royal land or for landlords; laws concerning the treatment of 
human beings pledged for labor; laws concerning injury to able-bodied human 
beings, thereby rendering them unfit for labor, as well as protection of fetuses; 
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the absence of evidence for contraception and abortion; the focus on usufruct in 
legislation; deportations, especially by the larger empires in the first millennium 
such as the Neo-Assyrian empire of the first millennium BCE; treaties, edicts, 
and correspondence that often include clauses concerning fugitives; evidence 
of rural laborers abandoning estates and fields and joining bandit groups; 
documents of estate administration, which provide lists of estates, laborers, 
yields, and tools, but simply ignore the extent of the estates themselves; the 
high cost of labor where landlords had to pay for it; the routinely low cost of 
land where it was transferred and despite evident fluctuations; and the constant 
desire for more people.5
 With short life expectancy and the ever-present threat of disease, let alone 
the economic desire of peasants to stay out of harm’s way in order to engage in 
subsistence-survival agriculture, the shortage of labour was a constant problem. 
Tying a person’s muscle power and skill into debt ensured that the land would be 
worked, for the sake of the state, temple, or landlord (unless the debtor simply 
absconded, which was a frequent occurrence). Labour may be secured in this 
fashion by interest rates that could simply not be repaid, thereby ensuring that 
the debtor remained in a permanent state of labouring for another (state or 
landlord). As Steinkeller puts it: 
 Assuming that most loans were made with other objectives than   
 the interest-generated profit in mind, it follows that, in such    
 circumstances at least, interest was a tool and not an economic end   
 in itself, being therefore devoid of real economic value. Its rate was   
 largely irrelevant vis-à-vis the amount of the loan, except that it had   
 to be sufficiently high to make it impossible for the borrower to    
 repay the capital.6
Across ancient Southwest Asia, it is clear that the lender hardly ever expected 
the debtor to repay the loan. If the loan was in terms of labour or produce, then 
this situation entailed that the debtor would need to keep working for the lender. 
If the loan was in terms of money, inability to repay would lead to a situation 
of indenture or ‘debt-slavery’, in which the debtor also ended up working for 
the lender. We may put it this way: a loan normally has some form of ‘collateral’ 
or ‘security’, which acts as a backup for the lender should the debtor forfeit 
repayment for some reason. However, the problem with such terminology is 
that it assumes that the actual loan is primary and the ‘security’ secondary.7 In 
the context of ancient Southwest Asia, it was precisely this ‘security’ that was 
primary. But what sort of ‘security’? Often it was a human being who was so 
pledged. This pledge may have involved a clan member, a dependent labourer, 
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or even oneself. In third millennium Babylon they did not pretend otherwise: the 
person pledged was simply designated the ‘hostage’ or ‘captive’.8 In short, debt’s 
primary mechanism was to ensure that the land under the control of state or 
landlord was worked by those able to do so. It was in their interest to see that 
labourers worked for them as long as possible, so they were keen to make debts 
unrepayable in conventional terms (at least from our perspective).9
 The second function of debt was to secure the flow of produce, money, 
and thereby wealth to the lender – a feature of debt perfected and raised to 
primary importance by the Romans and their civil law. Here interest comes into 
its own, although it was originally a foreign and unnatural idea, being subject not 
to ‘market forces’ but to royal decree and customary practice.10 In many respects, 
the Romans continued with such assumptions, but, being legal and ritual 
obsessives, they turned debt and its attendant interest into an utterly complex 
myriad of rules and regulations – all with the purpose of ensuring that the ruling 
class continued to gain from those under tenure and in debt the resources it 
felt perfectly justified in acquiring. For example, Pliny the Elder found himself 
constantly distracted by the concerns of his estates, their slaves and their 
tenants. Their antics and his attention to them threatened the immensely 
important task he felt called to undertake in life as a writer.11 Clearly, wealth went 
in one direction, from debtor to lender, and the lender would do all in his power 
to ensure the flow was relatively uninterrupted.
 By now the third function of debt should be clear: to reinforce economic 
hierarchy. To be sure, some lenders did come from the ruling class, but the vast 
bulk of debts were loaned out by well-placed lenders to those outside their own 
ruling class structures. The previous two features of debt – compulsion for labour 
and the flow of wealth – function in terms of and ensure the economic hierarchy 
between tenants and landlords, agricultural labourers to the ones who did not 
labour. It should come as no surprise that debt too was a feature of class conflict 
– the initial acts of popular uprisings have been and remain to cancel debts, 
destroy records, and reallocate land.12
Credit
Credit is quite different, based on allocative mechanisms rather than extractive 
ones. However, before discussing credit, I need to deal with the misconception 
that credit is secondary to debt. This misconception may be traced back in part 
to the magnificently flawed storybook by Adam Smith called Wealth of Nations.13 
The myth concerns a ‘tribe of hunters of shepherds’ which undergoes a benign 
process of specialisation and then exchange.14  Eventually, “every man thus 
lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society 
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itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society”.15 But this is only the 
beginning, for at some point a bright spark happens upon the idea of money, 
which may then be used as a medium of exchange between different objects. 
Their abstract value can now be expressed through money. Only then does 
credit appear, last on the scene and after specialisation, exchange and money. 
Apart from the fact that such a tribe or village has never been found and never 
will be found, for it is a fiction of Smith’s mind, the suggestion that credit is the 
final item of the procession belies the fact that credit is in many respects the 
primary form of economic engagement between human beings.
 Credit relies primarily on an allocative approach to economics, in which 
labour, equipment and produce were systematically allocated and reallocated 
among ancient communities. In this context, credit requires knowledge of and 
familiarity with the others in one’s community and thereby ‘trust’. Let me be 
clear: ‘trust’ as I use it is not a moral value, but an economic reality. It entails a 
complex pattern of reciprocal relationships within a known community. Credit 
is indispensable for the functioning of life in such communities. If one needs a 
plough for a day, one may borrow it from the common pool or from someone 
within the village community, with prior arrangement and acknowledgement 
in light of other’s requirements. Everyone assumes that it will be returned as 
soon the need has passed, since everyone knows that it has been borrowed 
and that someone else will need it for working his or her allocated strips of 
land. On the other hand, the village may have a few draft oxen, available for 
ploughing or drawing heavy loads. With such precious animals, who consume 
large amounts of water and fodder (so that only a few are kept in each village), 
the negotiations are more complex. Now we find that the oxen are used across 
all the allocations of land, with groups assisting one another in order to ensure 
that the ploughing is done. Indeed, the whole community has an interest in the 
land being ploughed, so it is unimaginable for any one person to claim an ox 
for themselves. A borrowed tool or animal, assistance with reroofing a dwelling 
or replastering a wall, the allocation of tasks, the reallocation of grain and meat 
during lean seasons, the need for a good cloak in order to visit a neighbouring 
village, the sharing of the tax burden imposed by an external and distant ruler 
with his armies … these and much more constituted the necessary system of 
credit by which these early communities functioned. In other words, credit was 
and is a feature of the economic systems of allocation. It ensured the mutual 
allocation and reallocation of all tasks and goods within the community. And 
it was reinforced by a complex pattern of social and cultural norms, fostered 
by clan relationships (however flexible and creative they might have been), by 
councils of elders and village leaders. If we refer to one of the texts from ancient 
Southwest Asia – the Hebrew Bible – we find that credit is simply assumed: they 
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recommend credit without interest (Deuteronomy 15:7-8; Ezekiel 18:16), bans 
on interest (Exodus 22:24 [25]; Deuteronomy 23:20-21 [19-20]; Leviticus 25:35-
37), if not regarding interest as a sign of depravity (Ezekiel 22:12) or punishment 
(Isaiah 24:2; 50:1; Job 24:9; Psalm 112:5-6).16
 To sum up my argument thus far, credit was a feature of allocative 
economic forms, ensuring a system of allocation and reallocation of the labour 
involved in agriculture and of the produce of such labour. By contrast, debt was 
an extractive economic form, in which those who do not engage in productive 
labour extract goods from those who do engage in such labour. Through debt 
the ruling class and their hangers-on extract labour and produce in a way that 
reinforces class hierarchy. In other words, credit was a system based on the 
known, whereas debt implies the unknown. In a situation in which an individual 
who went out on his or her own would soon perish, the village community and 
clan were the primary collectives. Here all were familiar with one another, and 
here credit could operate. We may speak of ‘trust’ in such a situation, except that 
trust was primarily a social and economic reality of familiarity and the known 
rather a moral precept. By contrast, debt relies on mistrust and lack of familiarity. 
Here class comes into play, in the sense that debt had three functions: the 
securing of labour in a situation in which labour was more often than not in short 
supply; the flow of wealth to lenders, who invariably were of the ruling class; and 
the reinforcing of the hierarchical relations of class.
Jubilee?
In light of these practices relating to debt and credit, I can now address the 
question of the remission of debts, of Jubilees.17 These typically took place 
spasmodically, usually at the beginning of a new despot’s reign.18 The ideal 
biblical formula in Leviticus 25 is thus a stylised literary rendering of a much 
more haphazard approach. These ameliorations have been called ‘clean-
slates’ or ‘abolitions of debts’,19 but they were anything but. The most common 
form was a partial and selective process of ‘debt easement’.20 Indeed, the key 
feature was the transfer of labour away from one type of dependency and 
back to an earlier type. This feature is illustrated best by the decree of Lipit-
Ishtar (1934-24 BCE), ruler of the city-state of Isin in Mesopotamia. The decree 
points out that the amelioration of debts had the purpose of putting debtors 
‘into their previous status’.21 If indentured labourers had become indebted to 
individual landlords (who were also the usurers), then they would be returned to 
dependence on the palace and its estates. If they had become tied to officials of 
the palace, then they would return to dependence on the temple and its estates. 
Indeed, the decrees were usually limited to specific types of debt, particularly 
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those concerning labour. They also focused on specific people who were too 
enthusiastic in ensuring debt labour, especially landlords and palace officials. 
The reason: systems of debt enslavement had the tendency to tie labourers to 
particular forms of indentured labour, which would make them unavailable for 
other types. This was especially the case with the corvée, or periodic labour 
service demanded of all subjects, which the state needed for building projects or 
for high labour periods like sowing and harvest. 
 Further, I stress that this process offered amelioration of debt obligations 
rather than abolition of debts. Apart from shifting labourers back to earlier forms 
of indenture, a ruler might reduce the corvée itself to ten or even four days a 
month. But he would do so only in situations of exacerbated economic crisis. 
Only when the system threatened to fall apart would they be enacted. They were 
safety valves that enabled a crisis-ridden system to continue. They also provided 
great occasions for political spin, seeking to gain favour with those overcome 
with debt – rulers would hardly engage in acts so economically disadvantageous 
out of their own good will.22 Ancient Southwest Asian rulers were accomplished 
propagandists. They loved hyperbole, especially when their domains were 
trivial, and attempted to dress their blood-soaked conquests in terms of justice 
and equity.23 They routinely proclaimed that they had returned justice, joy 
and food to their grateful subjects.24 In relation to debt and its amelioration, 
they sought to spin partial amelioration in the grandest terms, claiming that 
it was debt annulment itself. The truth was somewhat different. Indeed, most 
ameliorations were rescinded soon afterwards. In light of this inadequacy – from 
the perspective of the vast majority of the rural working population – of the 
Jubilee and the rapid return and expansion of exploitative patterns, debtors and 
even entire villages had many other means of escaping from debt requirements: 
absconding from fields when sowing was needed, not harvesting sown fields and 
leaving the crops to rot, or taking the produce with them. They would remove 
themselves from the landlord’s or state’s control, abandoning villages, joining 
‘bandit’ or ‘nomad’ groups and relocating.
 One may wonder whether the function of debt amelioration has changed 
since those times. Let me take the example of the Romans, who instituted 
an extraordinary collection of laws and legal practices relating to all manner 
of situations.25 Indeed, the Roman approach to law has influenced practices 
through to today (via a somewhat deviant path into which I cannot go here).26 
Let us consider for a moment the typical Roman loan contract.27 It contained 
clauses concerning late or non-payment, with an increase in interest (up to 50 
percent) and potential seizure of the property and person of the debtor.28 But 
Roman contracts could also be subject to various types of alleviation, whether 
statutory, obligatory, or voluntary. Statutory amelioration was enacted by the 
300
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Reconsidering Debt Remission in Light of the Ancient World
state, but obligatory or voluntary amelioration depended on circumstances, 
particularly climactic forces beyond the debtor’s control (vis maior). Obligatory 
amelioration usually took place via formal legal proceedings initiated by the 
debtor, while voluntary amelioration was undertaken by the lender in specific 
circumstances where the debt conditions were too onerous.29 If we take the 
situation of tenants under contract to a landlord, then these circumstances 
might include the threat of tenants walking off the land, selling equipment, or 
simply giving up on the contract. The reason why a lender would ameliorate the 
terms of debt was to keep tenants on the land, thereby ensuring the income 
of the landlord. In other words, the prime purpose of such amelioration was to 
ensure the continued productivity of the landlord’s estates. Thus, amelioration 
here too functioned as a safety-valve to ensure the system continued in the face 
of constant instability and crisis. It also played a role in labour compulsion: the 
myth of eventual repayment had to be kept alive so that debtors would at least 
continue to work the fields in question. If they ceased believing in the myth, they 
would walk away.
 The implications of this historical investigation in relation to the calls for 
Jubilee in our context should by now be obvious. First, such an amelioration 
is only ever partial and in the interest of the lender. It could be argued that no 
lender would agree to amelioration if there were not some benefit, but this does 
not change the nature of amelioration. Second, amelioration clearly functions 
as a way to release pressure on an economic system so that it can continue to 
function. It is certainly not a mechanism for replacing the system with a better 
one. This is apparent from the earliest practices of debt and remission. Third, the 
functions of debt may have shifted, with the securing of labour in a situation of 
shortage no longer the main purpose. But this could happen only in a context 
of the surfeit of labour (and so where labour is scarce, this function of debt 
returns). So we have a focus on transferring wealth from the debtor to the lender 
and ensuring economic hierarchies. Amelioration is part of this process. Finally, 
we face a paradox: while amelioration serves to bolster the current system, or 
indeed mode of production, a little longer, it may also be a short-term response 
that provides immediate and temporary relief. In this respect, it may be regarded 
in some way as a rational response to an irrational situation.
1  The term itself comes from yūbāl, which designates the ram’s horn to be blown  
 at the commencement of the period. The recent calls are typically found online.  
 See, for instance, Steve Keen’s ‘manifesto’ at http://www.debtdeflation.com/  
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